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This paper links the theory of interest groups influence over the legislature with that of congressionalcontrol over the judiciary. The resulting framework reconciles the theoretical literature of lobbyingwith the negative available evidence on the impact of lobbying over legislative outcomes, and sheds
light to the determinants of lobbying in separation-of-powers systems. We provide conditions for judicial
decisions to be sensitive to legislative lobbying, and find that lobbying falls the more divided the legislature
is on the relevant issues. We apply this framework to analyze supreme court labor decisions in Argentina,
and find results consistent with the predictions of the theory.
A lthough the influence of the Supreme Courton policymaking in undisputed, interest groupsdevote the bulk of their efforts to influence
legislators. This asymmetry is largely due to a com-
paratively easier access to elected politicians. Interest
groups can readily enter the political process by in-
fluencing legislators via campaign contributions, or by
providing information with electoral saliency. These
instruments are either directly absent or less effective
with a nonelective body such as the court. In this paper,
we focus on two intimately related questions arising as
a result of this asymmetry. How do the interactions
between a legislature and a formally independent judi-
ciary shape the incentives for interest groups to engage
in costly lobbying activities? Under what conditions
will lobbying effectively influence policy outcomes in
separation of power systems?
Answering these questions is important for three
main reasons. First, it will allow us to reassess the sta-
bility of the separation of powers’ system in response
to outside pressures. In particular, do potentially active
interest groups reinforce or weaken judicial indepen-
dence? Second, by explicitly modeling the interactions
between the legislature and the courts in the policy-
making process, our framework clarifies the biases that
result from putting the emphasis solely on the link be-
tween lobbying and legislative outcomes, and allows
us to improve on this benchmark.1 We show, in fact,
that our model reconciles previous theoretical argu-
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1 This, in fact, has been the approach in both models of vote buying
through campaign contributions (Baron 1994; Denzau and Munger
ments on the informative role of lobbying with the
weak empirical support for the connection between
lobbying and legislative outcomes in the United States
(see Ansolabehere, de Figueiredo, and Snyder 2002).2
Third, our framework contributes to extend the analy-
sis of lobbying in separation of powers systems beyond
the case of the United States. As an illustration of this
approach, we show that the empirical implications of
our model are largely consistent with the evidence on




The asymmetric impact of lobbying on the payoffs of
the court and the legislature shapes its effectiveness in
affecting policy in equilibrium, and as a result, impacts
interest groups’ incentives to engage in costly lobbying
activities in the first place. The overall effect of this
asymmetry rests crucially on the extent of effective ju-
dicial independence. Were the court completely insen-
sitive to outside pressures, the asymmetrywould induce
meager incentives for lobbying efforts. This degree of
court seclusion, however, is unusual. Although most
judiciaries are isolated from direct public approval,
they are not immune from elected politicians’ influ-
ence. Indeed, in most democracies, judicial decisions
are not the last word. Legislatures can normally re-
verse judicial statutory rulings with a simple majority,
although overturning constitutional rulings normally
requires a higher level of political consensus. The legis-
lature can, furthermore, affect the court’s incentives by
imposing sanctions such as court enlargements (Gely
and Spiller 1992), impeachments (Iaryczower, Spiller,
and Tommasi 2002), and in some countries simply by
not reappointing them.3 To sum up, the majorities in
1986; Snyder 1990, 1991) and informative lobbying (Ainsworth 1993;
Austen-Smith 1993; Lohmann 1995; Rasmusen 1993).
2 For studies finding a relation, see Stratman 1992, 1995, and 1996.
See also Snyder 1992.
3 This is, for example, the case of El Salvador, where justices must
be reappointed by the legislature. The budget could also serve as an
instrument of influence. See Toma 1991.
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government can constrain the decisions of the court.
This is the essence of the so-called, “separation of pow-
ers” literature: public opinion alters judicial decisions,
but does so only indirectly, by affecting the composition
and preferred policies of members of the legislature
(see Bergara, Richman, and Spiller 2003, and Segal
1997 for a discussion).
In this paper we consider the separation-of-powers
logic within a standard model of informative lobbying.
An interest group is privately informed about the dis-
tribution of voters in the interest-group-specific policy
space. Lobbying is costly, but the cost of a given level
of lobbying effort decreases with the voters’ support
to the interest group’s position. As a result, the level
of lobbying chosen by the interest group can convey
information to politicians in equilibrium.4,5 In this en-
vironment, the political constraints faced by the court
do not reflect public opinion directly, but are driven
instead by the actions undertakenby the interest group.
By focusing on the incentives of interest groups to lob-
bying only when such actions effectively influence pol-
icy outcomes, our approach provides conditions under
which previous accounts of interest group influence on
politicians can still survive, while reconciling the impli-
cations of these theoretical arguments with the weak
empirical support for the connection between lobbying
and legislative outcomes.
In the next sections, we develop these arguments
formally, and derive empirical implications of our anal-
ysis.We then apply this framework to empirically study
the politics of labor law constitutional interpretation in
Argentina from 1935 to 1998.
The Model
There are two individual players, the court and the
interest group, and a legislature populated by a contin-
uum of legislators with total size one. To fix ideas, in
what follows we will refer to the interest group simply
as the union. Policy space is X= [0, 1], and given ideal
policy zi, player i has preferences over policies x ∈ X
represented by a utility function ui(x, zi)=− 12 (x −
zi)2.6 Without loss of generality, we assume that the
union’s ideal policy is at the right extreme of the policy
4 Note that we are not assuming that the union’s messages are infor-
mative per se, and we are not assuming that the union represents the
median voter. We are, however, assuming that the union has private
information regarding the preferences of the electorate. This would
be the case, for example, if the interest group could observe, ex ante,
the cost of undertaking different levels of lobbying effort. Note also
that we not referring to transmission of technical information, which
would generate a symmetric response of legislators and the court.
Our focus is instead on the asymmetric impact of lobbying on the
payoffs of the court and the legislature caused by information that
can be linked to the support of citizens to a particular policy. This
includes, in fact, a broad range of interest groups (Ainsworth 1993;
de Figuereido 2002).
5 As we mentioned above, we assume that this information is not
directly relevant for the court. For arguments along this line, see
Staton 2006 and Vanberg 2001.
6 All resultswould go throughemployingEuclideanpreferenceswith
the usual properties. We present the analysis with specific functional
forms to illustrate the nature of the results in closed form solutions.
space, zu = 1, and refer to policy x′ as being pro-labor
with respect to x′′ whenever x′ > x′′.
Legislators and the court differ in their responsive-
ness to voters. In particular, we assume that the court
is completely unresponsive to the position of voters
in the policy space, and denote its preferred policy
by zc ∈ X. We assume, though, that legislators are at
least partially responsive to voters’ stance on the issue.
Assuming for simplicity that the distribution of voters
in the policy space can be characterized by a single
parameter θ ∈ X, we let the ideal policy of legislator j
be given by zL j (θ;βj ) ≡ βj + hθ, where for all j , βj > 0
and βj + h < 1. The parameter h allows us to capture
varying degrees of voters’ influence on legislators’ pre-
ferred policies. The degree of conflict in the legislature
is captured by the distribution of points βj among its
members, which we describe by the cumulative distri-
bution G(·); that is, for any point β, G(β) denotes the
proportion of legislators for which βj <β.
Policy outcomes result from the interaction of the
court and the legislature. Although the precise form of
this interaction depends on specific institutional details,
inmost polities the elective body can ultimately impose
its will under some sufficiently demanding procedure.
This final stage is the one we represent in the model:
the court chooses a ruling xc ∈ X, which the legislature
can reverse with the votes of a majority m ∈ [1/2, 1]
of legislators. We say that a court’s ruling is “stable”
in the legislature—–and therefore final—–if there exists
no alternative policy that a majority m of legislators
would prefer to it in a binary choice, and denote the set
of stable rulings given the majority rule m by Sm.
Legislators and the court are uninformed about the
realization of θ, and have common prior beliefs rep-
resented by the cumulative distribution function F(·)
with density f (·). We assume that f (·) has full sup-
port (i.e., f (θ) > 0 for all θ ∈ X), but otherwise allow
prior beliefs to be completely arbitrary. Informally, this
means that legislators can potentially be very well (but
not perfectly) informed about the realization of θ. In
contrast, the union is perfectly informed about the re-
alization of θ, and can potentially credibly transmit this
information through lobbying (organizing strikes and
public demonstrations). In particular, given a realiza-
tion θ′, the union can organize an observable level a of
demonstrations bearing a cost C(a, θ′). We will assume
that C(·) is twice differentiable, that for every realiza-
tionof themedian voter θ, C(0, θ)= 0, Ca(a, θ) > 0, and
that Caθ(a, θ)< 0; that is, the marginal cost of lobbying
is decreasing in the pro-labor stance of the population.
For simplicity of exposition, wewill further assume that
C(a, θ)= a(k− θ), k > 1.
The timing of the game can thus be described as
follows: (i) θ is realized and privately observed by the
union; (ii) the union decides a publicly observable level
of lobbying intensity a; and (iii) the court chooses a
ruling xc in the set of stable policies in the legislature
Sm.7
7 For completeness, there is a fourth stage in which the legislature
reviews the court’s decision, but given that courts would only make
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An equilibrium is a triplet ={γ(·), xc(·), F(·|a)}
consisting of (i) a strategy for the union, γ : X → R+,
mapping “types” θ to levels a of lobbying intensity a,
(ii) a strategy for the court, xc : R+ → Sm,mapping ob-
servations of lobbying levels a to stable rulings xc ∈ Sm,
and (iii) beliefs F(|a) by the court and the legislators,
such that:
(a) γ(θ) ∈ argmax
a∈R+
uu(xc(a)) − C(a, θ)∀θ ∈ X;
(b) xc(a) ∈ argmax
x∈X
{uc(x) : x ∈ S(m | a)} ∀a ∈ R+, and
(c) whenever a ∈ γ(X), F(·|a) is determined
from F(·) and γ(·)using Bayes’ rule.
In addition, we supplement this equilibrium concept
with a refinement restricting beliefs off the equilibrium
path known as criterion D1 (Banks and Sobel 1987;
Cho and Kreps 1987).8
The Symmetric Information Benchmark
We first characterize, as a benchmark, the symmetric
information equilibrium. Note that in this case legisla-
tors are perfectly informed about the value of θ, and the
union derives no benefit from lobbying, irrespective of
the preferences of the electorate. Hence, there will be
no lobbying in equilibrium. The relationship between
preferences of the electorate and policy outcomes in
the symmetric information environment, however, is
the key element determining the amount and effec-
tiveness of lobbying in the incomplete information en-
vironment.
We start by characterizing the set of stable poli-
cies in the legislature given majority rule m. Letting
βmL ≡ G−1(1 − m) and βmH ≡ G−1(m), it is easy to see
that Sm(θ)= [zL(θ;βmL), zL(θ;βmH)]. That is, βmL is the crit-
ical legislator for a pro-labor coalition, in the sense that
any policy x to the left of her preferred policy would
be replaced by a more pro-labor policy. Similarly, βmH
is the critical legislator for an anti-labor coalition, in
that any policy to the right of her preferred policy
will be replaced by a more anti-labor policy. Note that
βL(m) ≤ βH(m), and βL(m)=βH(m) only with simple
majority rule (m= 1/2), in which case Sm(θ) collapses
to the preferred policy of the median voter in the leg-
islature, and the court has no policy making power.
It follows that for m > 1/2, the set of possible court’s
ideal policies that would be stable given θ has positive
measure.9
policy choices that are stable, we can without any loss, discard this
last stage.
8 See the Appendix for a formal statement. Intuitively, this criterion
requires that on observing a deviation (an action not taken with pos-
itive probability by any type of agent in the candidate equilibrium),
the uninformed agents (court and union) will infer that the deviating
party belongs to the class of agents who had the greatest incentive
to make the observed deviation (Bernheim 1994).
9 Note that this framework allows us to accommodate different pro-
cedures for legislative approval. For example, consider the case in
which a policy has to be approved by two collective bodies (House
The court will then select its ideal policy unless it
is constrained either for being “extremely” pro-labor
or anti-labor in relation to the relevant players in the
legislature. In particular, since the preferred policy of
every legislator is strictly increasing in θ, a higher value
of θ results in a pro-labor shift of the entire set of
stable policies. A court with a fixed policy preference
zc may then become a “pro-labor” court for a legisla-
ture observing a low realization θ′(zc > zL(θ′;βH)), or
an “anti-labor” court for a legislature observing a high
realization θ′′(zc < zL(θ′′;βL)). Figure 1 depicts in bold
the resulting court’s equilibrium rulings as a function of
the state of nature, θ. The two parallel lines in the figure
represent the preferences of the critical legislators as a
function of the state of nature, zL(θ; βL)=βL +hθ and
zL(θ;βH)=βH +hθ. For each θ, the set of stable policies
S(θ) is the segment between these lines, the interval
[βL + hθ, βH + hθ] in the vertical axis. If, for some θ, the
court’s ideal point zc is in S(θ), the court will be able to
rule according to its preferredpolicy, facing no effective
legislative constraints. In the example depicted in the
figure, this occurs for all states between the (interior)
points θ0 and θ1. In this region, then, the flat portion of
the bold line represents the court’s equilibrium ruling.
For θ< θ0, however, S(θ) is entirely below zc. Thus, if it
were common knowledge among legislators that public
sentiment is strongly anti-labor, the ideal point of the
court would not survive the challenge of a more anti-
labor legislation. The best choice for the court in such
states is, therefore, to enact the most pro-labor stable
ruling; that is, βH + hθ. For θ< θ0, then, the bold line
representing the court’s equilibrium rulings coincides
with βH + hθ. Similarly, for θ> θ1, S(θ) is entirely above
zc. In this subset of states the legislature is too pro-labor
compared to the court, and thus the best choice for the
court in such states is to enact the most “anti-labor”
stable ruling; that is, βL + hθ. Proposition 1 below sum-
marizes the preceding discussion.
Proposition 1. Assume that the realization of θ is
public information. Then (i) γ(θ)= 0 for all θ, and




zL(θ;βH) = βH + hθ if θ ≤ θ0
zc if θ0 ≤ θ ≤ θ1
zL(θ;βL) = βL + hθ if θ ≥ θ1
Specifically, θ0 = 0 for zc <βH, θ0 = 1 for zc >βH + h,
and θ0 = (zc−βH)/h otherwise. θ1 is similarly defined,
with βL in place of βH.
The legislature thus effectively constrains the court
for some realizations of public opinion when the set
K ={θ : θ ≤ θ0 ∨ θ ≥ θ1} is nonempty. In other words,
the court will be able to rule its preferred policy inde-
pendently of public opinion only if this policy is both
and Senate, a committee and the floor, etc) by simple majority. In
this case, βL and βH would be given by the median voters in each
chamber, S(θ) would not in general be a singleton, and the court
would face a nontrivial strategic problem. To simplify the presenta-
tion, however, we continue with the benchmark interpretation of a
unicameral legislaturewith a supermajority rule unless it is otherwise
noted, and drop the m subscript when there can be no confusion.
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Note: In the case depicted in Figure 1, z(0; βH )< zc < z(1; βL ). The court is perceived as “pro-labor” for θ< θ0. Here the constraint is
binding and xPIc (θ) = zL (θ;βH ). Similarly, the court is perceived as “anti-labor for θ> θ1, and xPIc (θ) = zL (θ;βL ). For θ[θ0,θ1], the court is
unconstrained and xPIc (θ) = zc.
(i) pro-labor relative to the preferences of the critical
legislator for a pro-labor coalition before a pro-labor
electorate (zc > zL(1;βL)=βL + h) and (ii) anti-labor
relative to the preferences of the critical legislator for
an anti-labor coalition before an anti-labor electorate
(zc < zL(0;βH)=βH). Note that, as in Gely and Spiller
1990, this condition is more likely to be satisfied when
there is significant dissent in the legislature (the critical
legislators for a pro- and anti-labor coalitions are far
apart, βL	 βH) and legislators are not too responsive
to public opinion (h is small).
Moreover, it follows from proposition 1 that, in gen-
eral, the size of K increases with βL and decreases
with βH. Thus, the set of realizations of public opin-
ion for which the court is effectively constrained is
always smaller the higher dissent in the legislature is.
Proposition 1 does not imply, however, that the size
of K should be generically lower the less responsive
legislators are to public opinion. To see this, note that
the set of values of θ for which a sincere ruling by the
court wouldn’t be reversed by a more anti-labor policy
increases with h (the court benefits, in this regard, from
amore eager response of legislators to public opinion).
Hence, the overall effect of legislators’ responsiveness
to public opinion on judicial independence depends on
the relative position of the court in the policy space.
Informative Judicial Lobbying
The previous analysis showed that when the court is
constrained for some (publicly known) preferences of
the electorate, an increase in θ induces a more pro-
labor ruling, and thus, amore pro-labor policy outcome
in equilibrium. The first goal of this section is to show
that, when policymakers are uncertain about the re-
alization of θ, lobbying by the interest group restores
the complete informationmapping between the prefer-
ences of the electorate and policy outcomes. Suppose,
for example, that the court would be constrained for
some known preferences of the electorate. Then in
the presence of lobbying, the court would be forced
to adjust its behavior to reflect this constraint, even if it
would be independent to rule according to its preferred
policy given the prior beliefs of uninformed legisla-
tors. Similarly, suppose instead that the court would be
independent to rule according to its preferred policy
for some known preferences of the electorate. Then
the court would indeed be able to rule freely in the
presence of lobbying, even if it would be constrained
given the prior beliefs of uninformed legislators. The
result is stated formally in the next proposition (lemma
1 in the appendix provides a detailed characterization
of equilibrium strategies):
Proposition 2. In the unique D1 equilibrium:
(i) Lobbying γ(θ) increases with θ in K, and does not
change with θ in [θ0, θ1];
(ii) Court’s (stable) rulings xc(a) satisfy xc(γ(θ))=
xPIc (θ) for every θ, where x
PI
c (θ) is given in Propo-
sition 1. In particular, the pro-labor tendency of
rulings increases with the level of strikes; i.e., xc(a)
is increasing in a.
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That is, in equilibrium the level of strikes will reflect
the preferences of the electorate up to the extent that
this information can influence a binding constraint
for the court (and thus policy outcomes). We say, then,
that strikes are effectively fully informative. As long
as (informed) policy is responsive to the electorate’s
preferences, two union types facing different pro-labor
dispositions of the electorate will always choose dif-
ferent levels of lobbying, allowing the reproduction of
the complete information link between policies and the
preferences of the electorate.
This does not imply, however, that the equilibrium
will necessarily involve transmission of information.
In fact, lobbying will be completely unresponsive to
the preferences of the electorate if (and only if) the
court is unconstrained for every possible realization
of θ. Conversely, there will be a complete separating
equilibrium if (and only if) the court is constrained for
every realization of public preferences. That is, only if
the court’s ideal policy is “extremely anti-labor” (i.e.,
zc <βL), or “extremely pro-labor” (i.e., zc >βH + h) by
Proposition 1 standards.
Proposition 2 allows us to study the response of
the expected level of strikes and pro-labor rulings to
changes in the composition of the legislature. Note that
for our purposes changes in the composition of the
legislature are relevant only to the extent that they
affect the boundaries of the stable set of policies in the
legislature, zL(θ;βL)=βL + hθ and zL(θ;βH)=βH + hθ.
Moreover, recall from the analysis of the symmetric
information benchmark that the set of realizations of
public opinion for which the court is effectively con-
strained decreases with the degree of dissent in the
legislature. That is, in general, the size of K increases
with βL and decreases with βH. Proposition 2 then di-
rectly implies the following result, and its corollary:
Proposition 3. A pro-labor shift in the preferred pol-
icy of the critical legislator for a pro-labor coalition βL
(anti-labor coalition, βH), increases the expected pro-
labor tendency of the court’ rulings level Eθ[xc], and
increases (reduces) the expected level of lobbying, Eθ[γ].
Corollary 1. A mean preserving increase in the size
of the set of stable policies in the legislature reduces the
expected level of strikes in equilibrium.
Proposition 3 also has direct implications over the re-
sponse of equilibrium outcomes to changes in court’s
preferences. First, it is clear from the previous analysis
that the expected level of pro-labor rulingswill increase
following a pro-labor change in the court’s preferences
unless the court is constrained for every realization
of θ both preceding and following this change. The
change in the expected level of strikes is, however,
ambiguous.10 Similarly, we know from the analysis of
the symmetric information benchmark that the effect
of legislators’ responsiveness to public opinion on ju-
10 This should come as no surprise, however, since for this purpose,
increasing xc with βL and βH given is qualitatively similar as simul-
taneously reducing both βL and βH taking xc as given, and we know
from Proposition 3 that βL and βH have opposite effects on the
expected level of strikes.
dicial decisions depends on the relative position of the
court in the policy space. This implies that the relation
between lobbying and the responsiveness of legislators
to public opinion will also necessarily depend on the
relative position of the court in the policy space.
Empirical Implications
The model has direct and empirically refutable impli-
cations. The first two implications are unique to this
model. First, Proposition 2 states that, in equilibrium,
the “pro-labor” level of judicial decisions is increas-
ing in the extent of the union’s political activity. Thus,
we should observe more “pro-labor” decisions when
facing a higher level of union strikes. Second, the ex-
pected level of lobbying decreases the more effective
the separation of powers between the court and the
legislature is (i.e., the more divided the legislature is
on the relevant issues). Specifically, as the corollary to
Proposition 3 points out, we expect the level of strikes
to be decreasing in the amplitude of the set of stable
policies in the legislature.
Our model also has more standard separation of
powers empirical implications.As inmost separation of
powers models, Proposition 3 implies that the equilib-
rium level of “pro-labor” judicial decisions depends on
the political composition of the legislature. In equilib-
rium, a more “pro-labor” legislature will trigger more
“pro-labor” decisions provided that the court is effec-
tively constrained by the legislature. Thus, our model
provides unique, as well as standard empirical impli-
cations concerning separation of power models. The
unique implications allow a direct test of the signaling
value of interest groups lobbying.
THE POLITICS OF LABOR LAW
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION
IN ARGENTINA
In this section we apply the model to study the politics
of labor law constitutional interpretation in Argentina,
and provide an evaluation of its empirical implications
using data on strikes and supreme court’s decisions
between 1935 and 1998.
This case presents a natural application of the pro-
posed framework. On the one hand, although formally
independent, Argentina’s supreme court has faced
both implicit and explicit threats from the political
powers, and has adjusted its behavior accordingly (see
Helmke 2002 and Iaryczower, Spiller, and Tommasi
2002). On the other hand, following the consolida-
tion of Peronism, the unions controlled an institutional
and physical structure that allowed them to organize
large public demonstrations effectively. As a result, the
unions broadened their scope of interest from industry
level to national labor policies, and organized demon-
strations became instruments of political influence.
In this environment, the relevant assumptions we
impose to the analysis translate into the following mild
requirements. First, legislators are at least somewhat
responsive to (but not perfectly informed about) the
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preferences of the electorate.11 Second, the union
knows the cost of organizing public demonstrations,
and this cost decreases the more intensely voters op-
pose anti-labor legislation. As we have shown in the
previous section, under this assumption the observed
level of protests will transmit valuable information
about the preferences of the electorate to politicians
in equilibrium, even if the union’s slogans constitute a
biased representation of society’s interests.
The Political Environment
According to our framework, the relative position of
the court with respect to the set of stable policies in the
legislature is amajor factor determining both court rul-
ings and the level of lobbying. Our first task in defining
the relevant independent variables, then, is to obtain an
assessment of the distribution of preferences within the
legislature along a pro-labor/anti-labor policy space.
Throughout most of the twentieth century, Ar-
gentina had a strong presidential system with two
dominant political parties (Jones 2002; McGuire 1995)
characterized by a relatively sharp contrast in their
stance with respect to labor policies and the regulation
of organized labor (Fernandez 1988; McGuire 1997;
Rotondaro 1971; Torre 1983). Although all presidents
have sought, to some extent, support from (at least
some of) the unions, the strong association between
unions and the Peronist party, and the Peronist/anti-
Peronist division of Argentine society defined
Argentina’s political reality in the second part of the
twentieth century. Relying on these facts, we classify
each president (and its party in the legislature) as pro-
or anti-labor, and use this classification, along with the
partisan composition of the legislature, to obtain an
assessment of the pro-labor composition of the Argen-
tine legislature.
We start by classifying Argentina’s presidents be-
tween 1935 and 1997 as pro-labor or anti-labor, follow-
ing to the greater extent possible the “stylized facts”
presentedbyprevious studies. Presidents Farrel, Peron,
and all presidents who governed representing the Per-
onist Party (Campora, Lastiri, and Martinez in 1973–
1976, Menem between 1989 and 1999) were classified
as pro-labor. President Frondizi (1958–1962) did not
represent the Peronist party but was also classified as
pro-labor.12 The remaining presidents (mainly military
dictators and democratic presidents representing the
UCR Party) were classified as anti-labor.
Taking this classification as given, we use parties’
representation in the legislature to compute the distri-
11 This will generally be the case even in systems as the Argentinean,
where legislators’ reelection rates are low, since the electoral connec-
tion constitutes an asset for other elective posts such as governors,
majors and provincial legislatures. Moreover, this will generally also
be the case even if, as in Argentina, party bosses control the nomina-
tion to party lists, since party bosses need to maintain the support of
party members to retain the command of the party (see Iaryczower
2005).
12 Peronismwas banned from participating in the 1958 elections, and
PresidentFrondiziwas electedwith the explicit support ofPeron (see,
e.g., McGuire 1997).
bution of preferences for the upper and lower cham-
bers in each period t, GUt (·) and GLt (·).We assume, first,
that legislative parties are perfectly cohesive, and that
parties in the opposition have the opposite stance in the
labor policy space than the president’s party. The distri-
bution of imputed preferences for legislators of cham-
ber j in period t is in this case given by Gjt (x)=ωjt for
0 ≤ x < 1 and Gjt (1)= 1, where ωjt denotes the propor-
tion of seats held by the anti-labor’s party in chamber j
in period t (we assume here that ωjt = 1 during periods
ofmilitary interruptions to the democratic regime).We
also let parties be imperfectly aligned with the pres-
ident, and refer to this as a noisy representation of
legislative parties. Specifically, for both the anti-labor
and the pro-labor party, we assume that the propor-
tions of party members with ideal policy closer to the
extreme anti-labor (0) and pro-labor (1) policies are
given by a beta distribution B(α, β) with support in
[0, 1], for β= 1 and α= 0.1 and α= 0.2.13 With this
assumption, then, the distribution of preferences of
legislators in chamber j in a democratic period t is given
by Gjt (x;α)=ωjtBα(x) + (1 − ωjt )(1 − Bα(1 − x)).14
Dependent Variables
The dependent variables in our study are supreme
court’s pro-labor rulings and the amount of union
strikes. We define the variable strikes as the number of
strikes per year.15 Court rulings are those on labor and
social security cases involving the constitutionality of
government norms decided by the Argentine supreme
court between 1935 and 1998.16 Within this universe
of cases, we define the categorical variable pro-labor
ruling to take the value of one (zero) if a court ruling
13 This family of distributions is stochastically increasing in α and re-
duces to the uniform distribution when α = β = 1. Thus, the “noise”
in the identification of the legislative parties with the President in-
creases with α.
14 To clarify the second term in this expression, note that due to the
symmetry of treatment, the proportion of legislators of the pro-labor
party to the left of (more anti-labor than) a given point x in [0, 1] is
equal to the proportion of legislators of the anti-labor party to the
right of (more pro-labor than) the point 1 − x, 1 − Bα(1 − x).
15 Since these data were not available from a single source for our
entire period (1935–1998), we selected what we considered to be
the best possible source in our sample and generated the remaining
data using the percent variation in the next best available series. The
most comprehensive and reliable source is O’Donnel 2000, covering
the period 1955–1972. For 1935–1955 we used data from Rotondaro
1971, which independently covers the period 1935–1968. For the
period 1972–1998 we used Fernandez 1988, Nueva Mayoria 2001,
and Torre 1983.
16 By norms, wemean laws, presidential decrees, administrative deci-
sions and resolutions. Cases in which the constitutionality of a lower
court decision was questioned (arbitrariedad), and cases in which the
constitutionality of the interpretation of a norm by a lower court was
questioned, but not the norm in itself, were excluded. Moreover, we
also excluded those cases in which the supreme court decided not to
opine over the constitutionality of the challenged norm alleging for-
mal or technical reasons. Finally, to avoid duplications in substance
arising from the fact that the Argentine court does not have the
ability to determine a law as unconstitutional per se, but rather has
to deal with the unconstitutionality of its application to a particular
case (person), we limit the pool of cases to those published in extenso
in La Ley, the main judicial publication in Argentina.
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(i) upholds a government norm during a pro-labor
(anti-labor) presidency or (ii) challenges a government
norm during an anti-labor (pro-labor) presidency.
Independent Variables
The pro-labor composition of the legislature is relevant
for ourpurposes for two reasons. First, the appointment
of a president’s nominee to the supreme court requires
the approval of the senate (by simple majority until
1994). Thus, the pro-labor composition of the senate
affects directly the preferences of the court. To reflect
the influence of the senate in a simple manner, we use
the midpoint between the ideal point of the president
and the median voter of the senate at the time of ap-
pointment as an estimate of the pro-labor disposition
of each justice. The pro-labor disposition of the court
in each period, pro-labor court, is then defined as the
policy preference of the court’s median justice.17
Second, the pro-labor compositions of the upper and
lower chambers determine the set of stable policies in
the legislature in any given period. A ruling is stable
if it does not trigger a response by a pro- or an anti-
labor coalition in the legislature. Because until 1994
Argentina’s Constitution allowed the legislature to en-
large the supreme court with a simple law, we focus
primarily on the critical legislators for simple majority
rule in a bicameral legislature. These are denoted pro-
labor critical and anti-labor critical and defined—–for
both the cohesive and noisy representations of legisla-
tive parties—–as theminimumandmaximumamong the
median legislators of the upper and lower chambers.18
The equilibrium level of pro-labor rulings and strikes
depend, however, on the relative position of the court
with respect to the set of stable policies in the legisla-
ture. Consider first the court. Justices will rule based
solely on their preferences provided that their pre-
ferred policies are stable policies in the legislature,
and will otherwise adjust their rulings so that these
fall within the set of acceptable policies in the legis-
lature. As a result, court’s preferences will influence
Justices’ behavior directly only to the extent that the
court is unconstrained. If instead an anti-labor court is
constrained by the legislature, changes in the critical
legislator for a pro-labor coalition—–and not in court’s
preferences—–will influence court’s decisions (we call
this a pro-labor constraint). Similarly, if a pro-labor
court is constrained by the legislature, changes in the
critical legislator for an anti-labor coalition will influ-
ence court’s decisions (we call this an anti-labor con-
straint). We then define the following variables. Pro-
labor constraint equals pro-labor critical if an anti-labor
17 We do this for the cohesive and noisy representations of the
legislature. Note that the median voter in the Senate at the time
of appointment, T, is computed from the distributions GUT (x) and
GUT (x;α), respectively, and that therefore the measure of pro-labor
court changes with each specification.
18 We do, however, also include a model specified for two-thirds
supermajority required in both chambers. Denoting the critical leg-





H), the critical legislator for pro-labor and anti-labor coalitions
in this case are given by min{βUL, βLL}and max{βUH, βLH}, respectively.
court is constrained (i.e., if pro-labor court < pro-labor
critical) and zero otherwise. Similarly, anti-labor con-
straint equals anti-labor critical if a pro- labor court is
constrained (if pro-labor court > anti-labor critical) and
zero otherwise. Finally, court unconstrained is defined
as pro-labor court if the court is unconstrained, and
zero otherwise.
The union, on the other hand, will only engage in
lobbying if policy outcomes are responsive to lobbying
efforts. This implies that the expected level of lobby-
ing (strike activity) increases the more constrained the
court is, and decreases (corollary 1) with the length
of the set of stable policies in the legislature. We then
define the variablebinding as thedistancebetweenpro-
labor court and the set of stable policies, and length as
the distance between pro-labor critical and anti-labor
critical.
We also define two control variables related to the
political environment. First, we introduce the variable
dictator, taking the value 1 in periods of interruptions
to the democratic regime, to allow for possible direct
effects of military governments on both rulings and
strikes.19 Second, we introduce the categorical variable
post-Peron, which takes a value of one for observations
after President’s Peron initial departure from office in
September 1955. We introduce this variable to capture
two structural changes marked by the first adminis-
tration of President Peron. First, Peron’s first term in
office marked a structural change in the organization
of the labor movement, and in the consequent use of
strikes (see Figure 2). Second, it also marked a struc-
tural change in the relation of the polity to the judiciary
(see Iaryczower, Spiller, and Tommasi 2002).
Estimation
As indicated by Proposition 2, court’s pro-labor rul-
ings are increasing in the observed level of strikes. The
equilibrium level of strikes is in itself a response to the
political environment and the relative positioning of
the court in the (labor) policy space. It is not, however,
a function of actual rulings by the court, which only
happen after the level of strikes is observed. Specif-
ically, for our main specification, the variables in the
right-hand side of the equation for pro-labor judicial
decisions are given by court unconstrained, pro-labor
constraint, anti-labor constraint, post-Peron, and dic-
tator. The variables in the right-hand side of the strikes
equation are given by length, binding, pro-labor court,
post-Peron, dictator, along with three lagged observa-
tions of the growth of GDP, included as controls.
Thus, the model we estimate is a triangular system
of two equations. We then test the hypothesis that the
variance-covariance matrix is diagonal with the data
arranged on a case-based unit of analysis. Employing
the Breusch and Pagan 1980 test (see Greene 2000,
621), we conclude that the system is indeed fully re-
cursive, and thus proceed to estimate it equation by
equation (678). Furthermore, because pro-labor ruling
19 Recall that we also treat military governments as completely uni-
fied, anti-labor governments, controlling both houses.
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TABLE 1. Logit Regressions. Dependent Variable: Pro-Labor Rulings
Model I Model II
Variable Cohesive Noisy (0.1) Noisy (0.2) Cohesive Noisy (0.1) Noisy (0.2)
Strikes 0.003∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗ 0.003∗∗ 0.003∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Court unconstrained 1.437∗∗∗ 2.829∗ n.o. 1.856∗∗∗ 3.799∗∗ n.o.
(0.493) (1.497) (0.551) (1.591)
Pro-labor constraint 1.144 1.128 1.147 2.414∗∗ 2.955∗∗ 3.626∗∗
(0.734) (0.820) (0.968) (1.135) (1.299) (1.568)
Anti-labor constraint n.o. 1.565∗∗∗ 1.927∗∗∗ n.o. 2.307∗∗∗ 3.126∗∗∗
(0.496) (0.610) (0.627) (0.850)
Post-Peron −1.558∗∗∗ −1.449∗∗∗ −1.328∗∗∗ −1.891∗∗∗ −1.728∗∗∗ −1.402∗∗∗
(0.506) (0.462) (0.473) (0.620) (0.554) (0.554)
Dictator 1.064∗∗ 1.027∗∗ 1.083∗∗
(0.541) (0.480) (0.500)
Constant −0.346 −0.449 −0.637 −0.460 −0.847∗ −1.470∗∗
(0.405) (0.452) (0.548) (0.423) (0.509) (0.703)
Standard, N = 315 Democracy, N = 178
Database Goodness of Fit
Prob > LR chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000
Prob > Pearson chi2 0.019 0.018 0.025 0.033 0.027 0.029
Area u/ROC curve 0.673 0.674 0.676 0.682 0.698 0.709
Correctly Classified 0.616 0.648 0.648 0.607 0.646 0.674
Note: For each coefficient, the table shows the estimated value and standard deviation (in parentheses, below). ∗p < 0.1; ∗∗p < 0.05;
∗∗∗p < 0.01.
is a categorical variable, we use a logit model to esti-
mate the conditional probability of a pro-labor ruling.
Also, because the data for the number of strikes are
only available yearly, we use the number of strikes in
the year in which the supreme court decided the case in
the court’s decision equation. We use average annual
values for the right hand side variables of the strikes
equation.
Table 1 presents the results of the pro-labor rulings
equation under the cohesive and noisy representations
of the legislature for the complete sample (Model I),
and for only democratic periods (Model II).20
The results are consistent with the predictions
of the model. As in separation of power models,
the probability of a pro-labor ruling increases with
the pro-labor disposition of unconstrained courts
(court unconstrained) and when a binding constraint
20 The results presented in Tables 1 to 3 were obtained using STATA
version 7.0.
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TABLE 2. Logit Regressions. Dependent Variable: Pro-Labor Rulings
Model IV
Model III
Senate not Model V Model VI
Supermajority for Involved in S.C.
Stable Set Appointments Pre-Peron Strategic Defection
Variable Cohesive Noisy (0.1) Cohesive Noisy (0.1) Cohesive Noisy (0.1) Cohesive Noisy (0.1)
Strikes 0.004∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.023 0.025 0.004∗∗ 0.004∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.025) (0.025) (0.002) (0.002)
Court unconstrained 1.854∗∗∗ 1.951∗∗∗ 1.066∗∗∗ n.o. 2.282∗∗∗ n.o. 1.920∗∗∗ 3.785∗∗
(0.549) (0.415) (0.379) (0.708) (0.615) (1.622)
Pro-labor constrainta 0.959 0.735 2.129∗∗ 2.190∗∗ 3.249∗∗
(0.718) (0.749) (0.916) (1.011) (1.414)
Anti-labor constraint n.o. 0.481 n.o. 1.210∗∗∗ n.o. 2.486∗∗∗ n.o. 2.523∗∗∗
(0.367) (0.452) (0.760) (0.744)
Post-Peron −1.942∗∗∗ −1.205∗∗ −1.414 −1.327∗∗∗ −1.751∗∗∗ −1.574∗∗∗
(0.602) (0.530) (0.482) (0.452) (0.621) (0.579)
Dictator 0.675 0.678 1.666∗∗ 1.941∗∗∗
(0.443) (0.435) (0.714) (0.717)
Constant −0.540 −0.825∗ −0.136 −0.188 −1.304 −1.555 −0.649 −1.080∗∗
(0.429) (0.432) 0.36316 (0.427) (0.924) (0.975) (0.519) (0.642)
Standard, N = 315 Pre-Peron, N = 65
1 + Year for a change
Database Democracy, N = 172 Goodness of Fit of President, N = 210
Prob>LR chi2 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.005 0.000 0.000
Prob>Pearson chi2 0.039 0.144 0.024 0.015 0.104 0.088 0.073 0.049
Area u/ROC curve 0.670 0.751 0.669 0.659 0.769 0.761 0.671 0.698
Correctly Classified 0.593 0.686 0.616 0.625 0.754 0.754 0.592 0.643
Note: For each coefficient, the table shows the estimated value and standard deviation (in parentheses, below). ∗p < 0.1; ∗∗p < 0.05;
∗∗∗p < 0.01.
a Positive values of pro-labor constraint predict pro-labor rulings (PLR = 1) perfectly in models III and VI (observations were dropped).
for a pro-labor court is relaxed (an increase in anti-
labor constraint),21 or when a binding constraint for
an anti-labor court is further tightened (an increase
in a pro-labor constraint). The coefficient of pro-labor
constraint, however, is not statistically significant for
the whole sample (Model I), although it is statistically
significant at the 5% level for the democratic periods
sample (Model II).
Moving toward the more unique implications of our
model, we find that, consistent with Proposition 2, pro-
labor rulings increase with the level of strikes. This
result stands for both the cohesive and noisy represen-
tations of the legislature, and for the whole or only the
democratic period samples. In particular, setting the
value of all variables at their sample average, a 1 SD
increase in the number of strikes—–152.6 and 180.4 for
the complete and democratic samples—–increases the
probability of a pro-labor ruling by 12% to 13% for
both samples and models.
We also find that the pro-labor tendency of court
rulings increases during breakdowns of the democratic
21 Recall that the relative positions of the court and of the critical leg-
islators in the legislature vary with each specification. Thus, although
there are no instances in which the political constraint is binding for
a pro-labor court for “cohesive” parties, this event does indeed occur
under a noisy representation of the legislature.
regime, and decreases following President Peron’ s first
two terms in office.22
Table 2 presents the results of four exercises that
complement the previous analysis. In Model III, we
consider the model under the assumption that the rele-
vant majority determining the constraints for the court
is a supermajority of two thirds of the members of each
chamber. We find that the coefficients of strikes and
the preferences of unconstrained courts (court uncon-
strained) are statistically significant of the same order
of magnitude as in Table 1. Political constraints with
supermajority, however, seem to be less significant as
explanatory variables for court’s behavior.23
22 The effect of dictatorships on pro-labor rulings should be con-
sidered in addition to the effect brought by a unified government
(as we assume dictatorships imply unified governments). The results,
however, may also reflect the nature of cases that come up for deci-
sion to the court in dictatorship periods (more intensively anti-labor)
and in post-Peron periods (more intensively pro-labor).
23 The evidence, however, is not conclusive. On the one hand, al-
though there are no instances of a pro-labor court being constrained
by the legislature in the cohesive representation of the legislature,
the coefficient of anti-labor constraint is not statistically significant
in the noisy representations of the legislature (this is accentuated
with α= 0.2, with a p-value of 0.729). On the other hand, however,
rulings are always pro-labor when the constraint for an anti-labor
court is binding. In this case, these observations carry no statistical
information with respect to the likelihood function and have to be
removed from the estimation. This is not to say that this variable is
not relevant for the outcomes, but instead that its contribution can
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TABLE 3. Dependent Variable: Strikes (Annual Observations). Least Squares Regression with
Robust Standard Errors
Model I Model II
Variablea Cohesive Noisy (0.1) Noisy (0.2) Cohesive Noisy (0.1) Noisy (0.2)
Lengthb −180.8∗∗ −346.0∗∗∗ −212.5∗∗ −421.2∗∗∗
(85.3) (126.4) (89.1) (133.9)
Binding 223.3∗∗∗ 168.6∗∗ 145.3∗∗∗ 219.6∗∗∗ 159.6∗∗ 130.5∗∗
(83.1) (63.7) (51.3) (82.2) (65.5) (54.3)
Pro-Labor court −106.6∗∗ −169.0∗∗∗ −144.6∗∗∗ −100.7∗∗ −169.8∗∗∗ −139.1∗∗∗
(41.7) (58.6) (48.0) (43.5) (57.7) (47.0)
Post-Peron 328.2∗∗∗ 323.1∗∗∗ 289.1∗∗∗ 328.7∗∗∗ 329.5∗∗∗ 293.5∗∗∗
(39.2) (37.0) (29.7) (39.3) (35.5) (29.4)
Dictator −256.8∗∗∗ −337.7∗∗∗ −322.1∗∗∗ −258.8∗∗∗ −365.5∗∗∗ −357.2∗∗∗
(53.4) (84.2) (74.3) (53.4) (83.9) 74.2411
End Term 15.7 37.2∗ 46.0∗∗
(23.0) (21.0) (21.1)
cons 132.5∗∗∗ 216.7∗∗∗ 233.2∗∗∗ 121.9∗∗∗ 209.2∗∗∗ 226.9∗∗∗
(33.5) (59.1) (57.8) (39.4) (58.1) (55.7)
N 62 62 62 62 62 62
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
R-squared 0.66 0.67 0.68 0.66 0.69 0.70
Note : For each coefficient, the table shows the estimated value and robust standard errors (in parentheses, below). ∗p < 0.1; ∗∗p <0.05;
∗∗∗p < 0.01.
a All specifications include three lagged observations of the growth of GDP.
b Length is highly collinear with pro-Labor Court, post-Peron and dictator in the cohesive representation of legislative parties, and was
dropped from the analysis.
Model IV considers an alternative method to cap-
ture the preferences of the court. Although the ap-
pointment of the president’s nominees to the supreme
court requires the approval of the senate, part of the
literature suggests that the senate has only a formal
role in this procedure. In this case, our measure of
court’s preferences would be improved by simply re-
moving the influence of the senate. Thus, in Model
IV we assume that the pro-labor stance of each justice
equals that of the nominating president.24 According to
the goodness of fit indicators, Model I performs better
than Model IV. Model V considers the period prior
to the first administration of President Peron, during
which unions hadmore restrictive organizational capa-
bilities. Thus,wedonot expect strikes to be significantly
informative about the preferences of a wide electorate.
Consistent with this description, we find that although
the estimated coefficients of strikes remain positive in
all specifications, they are no longer statistically signif-
icant. Finally, Model VI considers the strategic defec-
tion hypothesis proposed by Helmke 2002. According
to Helmke 2002, the political constraints faced by the
Court in a given period can fall short of accounting
for the entire range of incentives faced by the Court.
The strategic defection hypothesis argues that Justices’
behavior reflects not only the effect of current political
constraints but also their anticipation of the political
constraints they will face in the future. To evaluate
this hypothesis, we restrict the sample including only
rulings decided at least 1 year before a change of pres-
be replaced by the rule: “if a supermajority constraint is binding for
an anti-labor court, the court will rule in favor of labor.”
24 We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this exercise.
ident. The results are similar, although the precision of
the estimates seems to improve, lending some support
to this argument.25
Table 3 presents the results obtained from the esti-
mation of the strikes equation. The independent vari-
ables in Model I include length, binding, pro-labor
court, post-Peron, dictator, and three lagged obser-
vations of the growth of GDP, included as controls.
The results are consistent with the model’s empirical
implications. First, according to Proposition 3 (and its
corollary), we expect the level of strikes to increase
the more constrained the court is, and decrease with
the size of the stable set (the “pooling” area). Table 3
supports these implications, as the coefficients of bind-
ing and length are of their predicted signs (positive and
negative respectively) and all are statistically signifi-
cant.26 Table 3 also shows that unionswere less combat-
ive during military governments, and that (as Figure 2
anticipated) the organization of the labor movement
since Peron resulted in a higher capacity of unions to
engage in political demonstrations.27 In Model II, we
also include the categorical variable end term, which
25 Alternatively, we could have assumed that the courts are able to
perfectly anticipate the identity of the future government with some
proximity to the date of change of government. The approach we
employ in the paper, although lending support to that hypothesis,
does not impose any particular assumption regarding these beliefs.
26 We note, however, that length was highly collinear with pro-labor
court, post-Peron and dictator in the cohesive representation of leg-
islative parties, and was dropped from the analysis.
27 We also find that the level of strikes decreases the more pro-labor
the court is. As noted in the previous section, however, the empirical
implication regarding the position of the court is ambiguous in gen-
eral. Thus, although intuitive, this finding does not provide evidence
in favor or against the model.
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takes the value of 1 in year t if a president’s termfinishes
either in t or in t + 1. The estimated coefficient is pos-
itive, although it is statistically significant at the 10%
level only for the noisy representations of legislative
parties. Our results, then, provide some indication that
unions strike more often in transitional periods.
CONCLUSIONS
Due to the comparatively easier access to elected politi-
cians, interest group lobbying has an asymmetric im-
pact on the payoffs of the legislature and the supreme
court. The overall effect of this asymmetry rests cru-
cially on the extent of effective judicial independence
from elective bodies. As a result, even if lobbying can’t
affect the court’s payoffs directly, it can do so indirectly,
by altering the political constraints under which the
court operates. The first contribution of the paper is
then to show that the empirical work on the impact of
lobbying has been looking at the wrong policy dimen-
sion. Rather than affecting policy by impacting on the
nature of legislation, lobbying may be affecting policy
via judicial decisions.
Identifying this mechanism, moreover, allows us to
reconsider the determinants and effectiveness of lob-
bying in separation-of-powers systems by putting to-
gether two observations. First, as we established above,
lobbying influences court rulings only indirectly, by
affecting the political constraints faced by the court.
Second, an interest group will undertake lobbying ef-
forts only if by doing so it can effectively influence
policy outcomes. We show, in fact, that in equilibrium
the level of lobbying will reflect the preferences of the
electorate up to the extent that this information can
influence a binding constraint for the court (and thus
policy outcomes). Thus, a key determinant of lobbying
is the extent by which the information so generated can
sway decisive majorities in the legislature to tighten
the political constraints faced by an anti-interest group
court, or relax the constraints faced by a pro-interest
group court. To sumup, policy outcomes aremonotonic
with respect to the level of lobbying, but the expected
level of lobbying decreases the more divided the leg-
islature is on the relevant issues (the wider the set of
stable policies in the legislature).
The model has direct and refutable empirical impli-
cations. The first two implications are unique to this
model. First, in equilibrium, the higher the level of lob-
bying, the more court decisions will favor the interest
group policies. Second, the expected level of lobbying
decreases the more effective the separation of powers
between the court and the legislature is (i.e., the more
divided the legislature is on the relevant issues). Specif-
ically, we expect the level of lobbying to be decreasing
in the amplitude of the set of stable policies in the legis-
lature. Ourmodel also hasmore standard separation of
powers empirical implications.As inmost separation of
powers models, the extent of the court’s opposition to
political bodies depends on the political composition of
the legislature. In the context of this paper, this implies
that amore “pro-interest-group” legislaturewill trigger
more “pro-interest-group” judicial decisions, provided
that the court is effectively constrained by the legis-
lature. Thus, our model provides unique, as well as
standard empirical implications concerning separation
of power models. The unique implications constitute
direct tests of the signaling value of interest groups
lobbying.
Our empirical results for the interactions among
unions, courts, and the legislature inArgentina are con-
sistent with this description. Argentine courts tend to
side more with unions the more unions strike. Unions,
in turn, strike more when courts face a more unified
legislature. It is in these situations that unions’ lobby-
ing makes the legislature more pro-labor, triggering,
then, more pro-union judicial decisions. Our paper,
then, suggests that analyses of lobbying should pay
closer attention to the actual nature of the policy mak-
ing process, and in particular, to the interaction of the
bureaucracy, the courts and the legislature.
APPENDIX
Definition (Ramey 1996). Fix a sequential equilibrium
, and denote the payoff in  of a type-θ union by U(θ).
Fix an off-the-equilibrium-path action a by the union; that
is, a /∈ γ([0, 1]), and suppose there is a nonempty set X′ ⊂ X
such that: for all θ /∈ X′ there exists θ′ ∈ X′ such that U(a, x,
θ) ≥ U(θ) implies U(a, x, θ′)> U(θ’). Then the equilibrium
is said to violate criterion D1 unless it is the case that the
support of F(θ | a) is included in X′. A sequential equilibrium
is a D1 equilibrium if it does not violate criterion D1 for any
a /∈ γ([0, 1]).
Lemma 1. Coupled with beliefs satisfying Bayes’ rule,
the following strategies constitute a sequential equilibrium:
(i) court’s strategy xc(a) is defined by xc(a)= xPIc (γ−1(a)) for
all a such that γ −1(a) ∈ K, and xc(γ0(θ0))= zc, where xPIc (·),
θ0 and θ1 are given in Proposition 1; and (ii) union’s strategy








)+ h2θ ≡ γ0(θ) if 0 ≤ θ ≤ θ0
γ0(θ0) if θ0 ≤ θ ≤ θ1,




+ h2(θ − θ1) ≡ γ1(θ) if θ1 ≤ θ ≤ 1
where s ≡
[
h (1 − βs) − h2k
]
for s = H, L.
Proof of Lemma 1. First note that if beliefs satisfy Bayes’
rule, then (i) for all a such that γ−1 (a) ∈ K, f(θ | a)= 1 if θ=
γ−1(a), and f(θ | a)= 0 if θ = γ−1(a), and (ii) for a = γ0(θ0),
f (θ | a)= f (θ)/[F(θ1) − F(θ0)] if θ ∈ [θ0, θ1], and f (θ | a)= 0
otherwise. Hence, it follows directly from Proposition 1 that
the Court’s proposed strategy specifies is a best response
given these beliefs. It remains to show the optimality of
union’s strategy given f (|a) and xc(). Todo so it is enough—–by
the revelation principle—–to consider direct mechanisms in
which every type has the incentive to make truthful an-
nouncements. Suppose first that θ0 > 0. Our initial step is
to show that if the restriction of the union strategy to [0, θ0]
is given by γ0(θ), as defined above, then a union of type
θ ≤ θ0 does not have the incentive to misrepresent its type by
claiming that its type is θ′ ∈ [0, θ0], θ′ = θ. To see this, consider
an arbitrary strategy γ˜(θ) and its restriction to [0, θ0]. Truth
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telling is then optimal for θ in this range only if:
θ = argmax
θˆ∈[0,θ0]





(1 − βH − hθˆ)2 − γ˜(θˆ) (k− θ)
}










= [1−βH − hθ]h
k− θ .
From this it follows immediately that γ˜(θ) is strictly increasing
in θ in [0, θ0] (the second order condition, assuring that γ˜(θ) is
incentive compatible across [0, θ0], follows from the assump-
tion that Caθ(a, θ)< 0. See Fudenberg and Tirole 1998, 262).




h (1−βH) − h2s
k− s ds





+ h2θ= γ0 (θ) .
Note that we have made use of the fact that γ(0)= 0. For
suppose not; that is, suppose γ(0)= a > 0, and consider a
deviation by type θ= 0 to action a = 0. Equilibrium policy
following the observation of lobbying level a = min γ([0, 1])
results in the complete information policy corresponding to
the lower type in the distribution; that is, xc(a)= xc(θ= 0).
But after a deviation, uninformed agents will respond with
strategies that are optimal given some beliefs with support
in [0, 1]. Then policy following a deviation cannot possibly
be worst for the union than equilibrium policy. Hence, the
deviation is profitable for type 0, because it reduces costs but
can’t adversely affect outcomes.
An identical argument shows that if θ1 < 1, a θ-type
union, θ≥ θ1, does not have an incentive to play γ1(θ)′′ for
θ′′ = θ, θ′′ ∈ [θ1, 1]. Furthermore, it follows from the previous
argument that a type θ< θ0 does not have an incentive
to play γP = γ0(θ0); that is, every type θ ∈ [0, θ0) prefers
(γ0(θ), zL(θ;βH)) to (γP, zc). Similarly, when θ1 ∈ (0, 1),
there is no type θ> θ1 with an incentive to play γP = γ1(θ1).
We continue by showing that when 0<θ0 <θ1 < 1, no
type in θ∈ [0, θ0] has an incentive to play γ(θ′) for
θ′ ∈ [θ1, 1] (and the opposite). That is, we want to show
that u(zL(θ;βH))− C(γ0(θ), θ)≥ u(zL(θ′;βL))− C(γ1(θ′), θ)
for θ≤ θ0, θ′ ≥ θ1. Since θ≤ θ0 prefers (γ0(θ), zL(θ;βH)) to
(γP, zc)= (γ1(θ1), zL(θ1;βL)), we have, for θ≤ θ0 :
uu(zL(θ;βH))− C(γ0(θ), θ) ≥ u(zL(θ1;βL))− C(γ1(θ1), θ).
(1)
Also, we know that θ′′ ≥ θ1 prefers (γ1(θ′′), zL(θ′′;βL)) to
(γ1(θ′), zL(θ′;βL)) for θ′ ≥ θ1, θ′′ = θ′, θ′′ ≥ θ1. In particular,
with θ′′ = θ1, this implies, for θ′ >θ1:
u(zL(θ1;βL))− C(γ1(θ1), θ1)≥ u(zL(θ′;βL))− C(γ1(θ′), θ1).
(2)












so that for θ≤ θ1 ≤ θ′,
u(zL(θ′;βL))−C(γ1(θ′), θ)≤ u(zL(θ1;βL))− C(γ1(θ1), θ). (3)
The result then follows from (1) and (3). In addition, (3)
also shows that any type in the pool [θ0, θ1] prefers the pool
than to announce θ′ ≥ θ1. A similar argument establishes that
when 0<θ0 <θ1 < 1, no type θ∈ [θ1, 1] has an incentive to
play γ(θ′) for θ′ ∈ [0, θ0], and that no type in the pool prefers
to announce θ′ ≤ θ0. Finally, it is easy to see that γ can have
no discontinuities at γ0(θ0), for in this case there would exist
θ< θ0 sufficiently close to θ0 for which a deviation by θ0 would
be profitable (involving a marginal loss in policy, but a dis-
crete reduction in lobbying costs). Similarly, it can be shown
that when θ1 < 1, γ1(θ1 = γ0(θ0) when θ0 > 0. That γ1(θ1)= 0
if θ0 = 0, as we argued above, is covered in the claim that
γ(0)= 0.
Proof of Proposition 2. That there exists an equilibrium
where (i) and (ii) hold follow immediately from Lemma 1.
It remains to show that this is indeed the unique equilibrium
satisfying criterion D1. So let 
˜≡ (γ˜, x˜c, f˜ (·|a)) be an equi-
librium satisfying criterion D1. We will show (drawing from
Ramey 1996) that if θ0 > 0, then γ˜(θ)= γ0(θ) ∀ θ ∈ [0, θ0]. The
same argument can then be applied to show that if θ1 < 1,
then γ˜(θ)= γ1(θ)∀ θ ∈ [θ1, 1].
From the proof of lemma 1, we only need to show that
γ˜(θ) is strictly increasing in [0, θ0]. So suppose that this is
not the case. That is, for a > 0, let ˜−1(a) denote the inverse
image set of a under γ˜, and suppose that there exists an
aP > 0 such that X˜P0 ≡ {θ ∈ ˜−1(aP) : 0≤ θ≤ θ0} is not a sin-
gleton. Since γ˜ must be monotonically (weakly) increasing,
X˜P0 must then be an interval [θ, θ¯] ⊆ [0, θ0]. Let xL(f˜ (·|a);βL),
and xL(f˜ (·|a);βH) denote the preferred policies of the critical
legislators βL and βH given beliefs f˜ (·|a). As in the case with
complete information, we can now show that the set of stable
policies is given by Sf˜ (·|a) = (xL(f˜ (·|a);βL), xL(f˜ (·|a);βH)) ≡
(s(a), s(a)). But if X˜P0 = [θ, θ] ⊆ [0, θ0], then Bayes’ rule and
the full support assumption imply that f˜ (θ | aP) > 0 for every
θ ∈ [θ, θ] and f˜ (θ|aP)= 0 otherwise. This in turn implies that
zL(θ;βH)< s(aP)< zL(θ;βH). And since θ¯ ≤ θ0 = (zc − βH)
/
h,
then zL(θ;βH) < zc. Thus the constraint is binding for the
Court, and x˜c(aP)= s¯(aP). Next, choose θ< θ sufficiently
close to θ so that s¯(aP)< zL(θ;βH). Since by assumption
Caθ < 0, the slope of a union’s indifference curve in the
(a, x) space is decreasing in the type θ, and we can always
find a pair (a∗, x∗c) such that U(a
∗, x∗c , θ)> U(a
P, s¯(aP), θ)
(1), and for any θ′ <θ U(a∗, x∗c , θ˜)< U(a
P, s¯(aP), θ˜)∀θ˜ ≤ θ′
(2). Furthermore, we can as well find one such pair for
x∗c < zL(θ;βH). Suppose first that a ∈ range(γ˜). Since γ˜ is an
equilibrium, this implies that x˜c(a∗)< x∗c (IC for θ). But then
(2) implies that γ˜(θ˜) = a∗∀θ˜ ≤ θ. Then supp {f˜ (·|a∗)} ⊂ [θ, θ]
and hence x˜c(a∗) ≥ zL(θ;βH), which is a contradiction. Now
suppose instead that a /∈ range(γ˜). Then if U(a∗, xc, θ˜) ≥
U(aP, s¯(aP), θ˜) for θ˜ ≤ θ, (2) implies that xc > x∗c , so that, by
(1), U(a∗, xc, θ)> U(aP, s¯(aP), θ). Thus criterion D1 requires
supp {f˜ (θ | a∗)} ⊆ [θ, θ].But in this case type θhas an incentive
to deviate from the proposed equilibrium behavior. 
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